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CLASSIC WAR




Everything possible will be done to set major Western Powers 
against each other. 
Where individual governments stand in path of their purposes 
pressure will be brought for their removal from office. 
They will, as a rule, work toward destruction of all forms of 
personal independence, economic, political or moral. 
To undermine general political and strategic potential of major 
western powers,  efforts will be made in such countries to disrupt 
national self confidence, to hamstring measures of national 
defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all 
forms of disunity.
The “hybrid war” - simultaneous and adaptive 
employment of a complex combination of conventional 
weapons, irregular warfare, terrorism, and criminal 
behavior in the battlespace to achieve political objectives. 
Frank G. Hofman. Hybrid vs. compound war 
Armed Forces Journal October 1, 2009
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New Generation Warfare
+ cyber attacks;
+ supported by a malicious information campaign.
+ coordinated by only a mission command center.
+ and political, economic, cultural domain.
The main form of hybrid war against Ukraine is a 
combination of diverse and dynamic action of regular 
army forces of the Russian Federation together with 
illegal armed groups and criminal elements whose 
activities are coordinated and carried out by the only 
Concept and plan of action with vigorous employment 
of propaganda, deliberate damage, sabotage and terror.
The Concept of  the Ukrainian security and defense sector development 
Approved by Order of President of Ukraine (№92, March 14, 2016)
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New Generation Warfare
The very "rules of war" have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of 
achieving political and strategic goals has grown…..
The focus of applied methods of conflict has been altered in the direction 
of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, 
and other nonmilitary measures - applied in coordination with the 
protest potential of the population.
All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character, 
including carrying out actions of informational conflict and the actions 
of special-operations forces. The open use of forces - often under the guise 
of peacekeeping and crisis regulation - is resorted to only at a certain stage, 
primarily for the achievement of final success in the conflict.
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New Generation Warfare
V.Gerasimov
Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
“The value of science lies in foresight”
February 27, 2013
The Lessons of the “Arab Spring”
The Russian “hybrid war” against Ukraine 
demonstrates that influencing energy 
industry and services of Ukraine 
(including critical energy infrastructure) 
constitutes an important part of 
the strategy of state in war.
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HYBRID PEACEFARE: THREATS 
TO CRITICAL ENERGY 
INFRASTRUCTURE
NPS Defense Energy Seminar Monterey, CA, USA. 3 of May, 2019
Russian energy policy of “peaceful period” towards Ukraine
There were three main directions of Russian policy (or “active measures”)
targeting vulnerabilities of Ukrainian energy sector:
• Keeping Ukraine dependent on Russian technologies, components and 
services, while reducing Russian dependence. (Reducing Russian 
dependence on technological links with Ukraine; developing transportation 
routes bypassing Ukraine.)
• Keeping influence (control) over Ukrainian companies and markets. (Getting 
operational control over assets; privatizing companies through debt creation 
due to existing nontransparent gas trading deals; establishing JSC 
(consortium for Ukrainian transportation systems.)
• Blocking reforms in the energy sector. (Transparency of decision making, 
continuity and predictability of policy, termination of in-kind subsidies on 
energy markets.)
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Ukrainian energy dependence upon Russian (January 2014)
The Russian policy of influence resulted in deep dependence of Ukraine upon
decisions of Kremlin, regarding:
• Supply of fresh nuclear fuel from Russia to the Ukrainian NPP and
managing of the waste and spent fuel. (Ukraine had been buying 100% of nuclear
fuel from Russia and sending spent fuel to Russia for storage.)
• Natural gas supply for consumption. (70 + % dependence of total consumption and
100% of import.)
• Oil and oil-refinery products supply. (80% dependence of total consumption
originated from Russian controlled oil-refineries.)
• Oil-refinery utilization rate. (80% crude oil supply from Russia; 4 from 6 oil-refineries
were bought out by Russian capital + 1 disputed. )
• Transit routes capacity utilization rate for the transportation of natural gas,
oil. (transportation volumes were determined by the decision of the Russian government.)
• Sustainability of the power and gas transmission systems. (depends on the
synchronous operation of the systems of Ukraine and Russia.)
Only coal supply was relatively independent from Russia (Ukraine 
produced 100% of energy  and 70% of coke types of coal)
NPS Defense Energy Seminar Monterey, CA, USA. 3 of May, 2019
• The “economic” approach - all players are
economically motivated, so disputes between countries
is only commercial disagreements.
• The “economy-political” approach - sometimes
players can act in noneconomic manners, some
countries can use energy recourses to pursue its
political as well as economical objectives.
Economic or political factors are behind a scene?
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Economic or political factors are behind a scene?
NORD STREAM – Splitting Europe and Values
Modern example of a problem
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We have a category of people who 
have become billionaires, as we say 
overnight. The state appointed them 
as billionaires. It simply gave out a 
huge amount of property, practically 
for free. They said it themselves, ``I 









Are they just ordinary 
business entities?
Economic or political factors are behind a scene?
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HYBRID WARFARE: THREATS 
TO CRITICAL ENERGY 
INFRASTRUCTURE
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AFU briefing: http://komnbo.rada.gov.ua/komnbo/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=53452&cat_id=44731
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The leakage
The plan of Russian Army 
group troop “North” 
(operation in Ukraine) 
(includes the list of CI have to be 
seized in first hours of operation)
Minimal Russian expectation 
of captured Energy Assets of Ukraine 
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Gas Transit System of Ukraine









Unified Electrical Power System of Ukraine
Gas fields and gas network at Crimea
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Captured oil rigs 
and gas fields
Oil rigs at Black Sea shelf 
(Odessa gas field) seized 
by Russian military in 
March 2014 
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Restrictions of construction
Due to the unique construction 
features of the Kerch Bridge, to 
cross underneath vessels can be no 
more than 160 meters long, 31 
meters wide and 33 meters tall, with 
a draft of up to 8 meters.
From now on, vessels of Panamax 
type cannot pass through the canal.
Blocking of free passage for vessels 
On 25 November of 2018 Russia 
stopped all navigation through the 
waterway using a cargo ship 
accompanied by two Russian military 
boats standing under the arch of the 
Kerch Bridge and blocking the only 
passage through the strait.
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Captured by Russian forces 
oil rigs and fields (zones of 
permanent patrolling and 
protection by Russian Navy
Construction of the Kerch 
Strait Bridge and restriction 
of freedom of shipping 
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Location of shelling 
in July 2015
Threats Examples (the lessons from Ukraine)
Blocking functioning 
and/or seizing of CEI
(capturing the income 
flow)
Seizure of Critical Energy Infrastructure
(CEI) in Crimea and at occupied
territories of Donbass
Destruction of the power 
system (increasing the 
burden cost)
Disabling (by different actions) TPP
equipment, power lines, transformers
Cyber attacks against 
CEI  (making 
dysfunctional systems)
Multistage and complex attacks at
critical energy infrastructure
The threats to CEI in a “hybrid” warfare
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Dismantling of industrial enterprises,
mines, tram- and railways, power lines
at Donbass.
Repeated damage of water canals and






Militants have repeatedly shelled the
critical infrastructure as well as
restoration teams in order to prevent
repairing the infrastructure.
The threats to CEI in a “hybrid” warfare
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Cyber attacks against critical infrastructure 
Primary attack: 
- SCADA hijack with malicious 
operation to open breakers.
Supporting attacks:  
- Schedule disconnects for UPS systems 
- Telephonic floods against distributional 
companies’ customer support line.
Amplifying attacks: 
- KillDisk wiping of workstations, servers, 
and an HMI card inside of an RTU.
- Firmware attacks against Serial-to-
Ethernet devices at substations. 
This activity was identified 
as a multi-stage intrusion 
campaign by cyber actors. After 
obtaining access, the cyber 
actors conducted network 
reconnaissance, moved laterally, 
and collected information 
pertaining to Industrial Control 
Systems.
December 2015 Attacks on power distributional network control centers
Attack caused blackout in three 
western regions of Ukraine
December 2016 Attack upon HV Substation, caused another 
blackout in Kyiv region
V.Gerasimov
Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
«Vectors of military strategy development» 
02.03.2019
Particularly relevant is the rationale for creating an integrated 
system to protect the critical infrastructure from exposure in all 
areas during the immediate threat of aggression, when the 
enemy will seek to destabilize the situation, create an 
atmosphere of chaos and uncontrollability.
This question is new in the theory and practice of military 
strategy and is subject to comprehensive scientific study. The 
result of the work should be theoretical positions, and in practice 
the developed system of joint use of multi-departmental 
forces and means to ensure integrated security.
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Critical Infrastructure in Hybrid warfare
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Critical Infrastructure in Hybrid warfare
Russian Naval Forces’ role in the field of naval activity 
and critical infrastructure
Development and protection of underwater pipelines is one of most 
important priorities. 
Naval Doctrine of Russia up to 2030  (26 of July 2015) 
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50060
Destruction of enemy's military and economic potential by striking its 
vital facilities from the sea.
Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field 
of naval activity for the period up to 2030. (20 of July 2017) 
http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/42117
ENERGY WEAPON 
AND ITS INFLUENCE ON 
NATIONAL SECURITY
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Aggressor's 
tools




Seizure of energy production  units and 
infrastructure. (Industry, resources, infrastructure)
Payment for stolen resources, goods and services.
- Ukraine compensates bills for energy supply to the occupied 
territories, while consumers of these areas do not pay.
- Ukraine forced to buy coal captured  from stolen mines at 
occupied  territory (under the facade of Russian contracts).
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The “energy tools” of hybrid warfare
Aggressor's 
tools




Protection against possible attacks by means of 
positioning military units at critical infrastructure. 
(Chemical or power plants , energy supply networks)
Getting advantages in military operations. (Aggressor 
knows about position of the forces protecting critical 
infrastructure, i.e., power plants, transportation hubs, 
airports.)
Getting advantages in political negotiation process. 
(Ensuring favorable conditions for contracts on supplying 
recourses, spare parts, humanitarian corridors, ceasefire, 
peace talks, etc.)
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The “energy tools” of hybrid warfare
Aggressor's 
tools




Distorting functioning of the Ukrainian unified 
energy system. (Lack of fuel (coal, natural gas) for power 
generation.)
Stopping power supply. (Damage to TPP and transformer 
substations, gas pipelines.)
Termination of water  supply to  cities due to 
breakdown of pumping stations. (Damage to electrical 
network, pipelines, preventing repairs.)
The “energy tools” of hybrid warfare
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Aggressor's 
tools







Publicizing “good” Russia and “bad Ukrainian
government” that is unable to overcome energy
supply disruptions. (Chaos in energy industry, corruption
and increasing of prices.)
Generating fake news. (Appeal of major town of
Genitchesk (Kherson region) to Putin for gas supply.)
Criticizing Ukraine on international level about
power supply disruption to Crimea, and forcing
Ukraine to “accept” occupation.
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The “energy tools” of hybrid warfare
NPS Defense Energy Seminar Monterey, CA, USA. 3 of May, 2019
As requested by this “temnyk”, in a 10-day period there were more than 120 
fake publications at just one web-site, and just by a well-known St. 







in period from 
28 of March –
6 of April, 
2014
Юрий Христензен. Кащеева игла Кремля - на острие пропаганды. 
http://www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=5B221117D46C7
MANIPULATION and DISINFORMATION
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Russian TV-Chanel “First” spread another fake about Ukraine - January, 2019
The russian channel stated that in the town 
of Smela (Cherkasy region) there are huge 
problems with a heat supply for 
households, and a “special police corps 
landed to prevent rallies and protests”.
There was shown “a disappointed, complaining Ukrainian, former participant of 
“Euromaidan.”  “Euromaidan personally gave me nothing. Here, look where we are. It was 
necessary to look into the future, and in the future we were left without heat, with expensive 
energy, and it is not clear when all this will end. How to survive the winter, how to send 
children to school? ”- Kirill Chubenko.
Later, this man was identified as Belorussian student. He had never been in Ukraine 
MANIPULATION and DISINFORMATION
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Learned lessons from Ukraine
- Intentional destruction of critical infrastructure and disruption of 
vital society functions should be considered as a hybrid tool of 
warfare and taken into consideration by security and defense 
policy.
- The destruction of the infrastructure is not the final goal of the 
attacks. The purpose is to achieve the larger goal of economic 
and political weakening of the country, and to bring the  loyalists 
to power.
- Events involving critical infrastructure and its ability to provide 
vital society functions and services are accompanied by 
information (or rather disinformation) campaigns.
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Learned lessons from Ukraine :
In case of Ukraine, the messages of informational campaigns were 
different, depending on the target audience (i.e., Russia, Ukraine, or 
EU and USA):
–Western audiences: the promotion of the idea that Ukraine is an 
unreliable and even dangerous partner, because it can not ensure 
safety of its nuclear power plants/materials, reliability of natural gas 
transit to Europe, safety of civilians. 
– Ukrainian and Russian audiences: there was a message that power 
in Ukraine was seized by a “junta”, which does not care about the 
people and cannot provide their safety.
– Simultaneously, a message was sent stating that the conflict was a 
Ukrainian civil war with no involvement from Russia, and that it 
threatened a humanitarian catastrophe on a European scale.
MEASURES COUNTERING THREATS 
TO ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE: 
Ukrainian lessons
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COIN Strategy - Primacy of Non-Military Means
U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, 2009
COIN Operations
The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual
David H. Petraeus, 2006
Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic 
actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.
Insurgents use all available tools—political (including diplomatic), informational (including 
appeals to religious, ethnic, or ideological beliefs), military, and economic—to overthrow 
the existing authority.
Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; each side aims 
to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate. 
An essential COIN task for military forces is fighting insurgents; however, these forces can 
and should use their capabilities to meet the local populace's fundamental needs as well.
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COIN operations
The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual
David H. Petraeus, 2006
Capabilities. Capabilities can refer to the ability of local authorities—those of the host 
nation or some other body—to provide a populace with key functions or services. 
Commanders and staffs analyze capabilities from different perspectives, but generally 
put priority on understanding the capability of the Host Nation government to support 
the mission. The most essential capabilities are those required to save, sustain, or 
enhance life, in that order.
Some of the capabilities are: Public administration, Public safety,  Emergency 
services, Water, Electricity, Sanitation, and Medical care.
Figure 8−1. Comparison of essential services availability to insurgency effectiveness
Civil−Military Operations Center






















Establishment of Emergency HQ 
Donetsk water filtration station stopped functioning due to lack of power supply  
Civil-military cooperation (army forces supported emergency response (food, fuel, generators, 
explosives cleaning etc)
Emergency situation declared - absence of electricity, water, heat and gas supply in town of Avdiivka
Civil protection units started launched an emergency response plan 
(evacuation, tents for heating points, food, generators, fuel, information etc)
Ukrainian police units support emergency action (order, protection, fuel, generators, information etc)
Ukrainian Army Forces - support restoration efforts (protecting repair team personal) 
Civil protection service provides additional forces and equipment mobilized from other 
regions of Ukraine (generators, fuel, food and water supply, tents for heating points)
Ukraine had asked international organizations to help achieve ceasefire 
agreement and restore power lines
Water supply is provided for 2 hours per day with help of  generators delivered by emergency service 
Internal TPP of Avdiivka Coke Plant provides limited heat supply for Avdiivka residents (to keep 
system from frezing)
Heavy attacks of  Pro-Russian armed mercenary forces at outskirts of town of Avdiivka 
Shelling of critical infrastructure by mercenary forces
Pro-Russian armed mercenary forces reject ceasefire agreement in order to repair power lines
Earlier damaged the first power line by mercenary forces
Damaging by mercenary forces of the second power line (the last one)
Mercenary forces fire at repair team not allowing them to approach  
Providing electricity for hospitals, schools  with help of  backup generators
Establishing heating points (tents) around town, food distribution and medical services 
Encouraging volunteers to help people from Avdiivka
Ukrainian Army Forces – secure other critical infrastructure 
Location: 










absence of heat, 
water, electricity
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- Enhancing protection of CI according to established level of threats. 
(Organizational and technical measures, responsibilities of army and 
law enforcement forces) – there is a need to have a list of CI.
- Increasing awareness of armed forces and law enforcement units 
about the importance of CI – there is a need to include CIP issues in 
defense planning and training (education and training).
- Strengthening civil-military cooperation, encouraging voluntary 
support in securing energy supply to households – there is a need to 
develop CIMIC, PPP, voluntary initiatives.
- Creating reserves of energy resources and generating capacities, 
using the capabilities of the armed forces – there is a need to identify 
the option when the army (other military structures) could provide 
temporal energy supply support of communities.
Measures taken by Ukraine in a period of war
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- Establishing a communication channel between the fighting parties 
– there is a need to involve a third party in order to secure ceasefire 
during repair work on restoring infrastructure.
- Coordinating the CI protection and restoration efforts
– there is a need to set the groups that will protect the CI, and help in 
restoration (local authorities, army and law enforcement agencies, 
operators of CI).
- Establishing an international monitoring mission to prevent 
deliberate infrastructure damage and obstruction of CI restoration –
there is a need to create an international legal basis.
- Establishing an international framework for preventing malicious 
infrastructure damage – there is a need to create international 
regulation on formation exchange and preventing CI damage.
Measures taken by Ukraine in a period of war
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The main set of measures could be realized through “engineering 
and technical measures of CI protection”:
- Constructing physical protection barriers. (Walls, structures, 
buildings, installations.)
- Preparing reserve capacities. (Fuel reserves, switching of fuels, 
generation units, interconnections of transit and distribution 
lines.)
- Preparing emergency plans. (Establishment of a list of 
predefined actions, e.g., limits on power supply, timing of 
limitation, support of consumers, power switching, etc.)
- Setting the regimes of CI operation and information sharing 
according to levels of threats.
Measures taken in advance (preparedness plan)
POLICY DEVELOPMENT
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Developing CIP in Ukraine  
Improving legislation – the need for common working language and 
unified procedures of communication and interactions. 




Development of preparedness plan – the need 
for clear procedures to coordinate efforts of 
different agencies. Ukraine currently developing “The 
Critical  Infrastructure Protection Law”; “The Energy 
Security Law”; and “The Energy Resilience Plan.”
Training and exercises  – the need for regular 
training, and looking for gaps in procedures. 
Ukraine holds  a number of Table-Top Exercises 
(“Coherent Resilience 2017 - on Critical Electrical 
Infrastructure Protection” and “Coherent Resilience 2018 - on 
Financial and Transport Infrastructure Protection”)
The Concept of Building a State Critical Infrastructure 
Protection System in Ukraine, approved by Resolution of 
Government of Ukraine of 6 December, 2017 № 1009-p.
Table-Top Exercise «Coherent Resilience 2017» 
The Ministry of energy and coal industry of Ukraine, the National Institute for Strategic 
Studies, together with the NATO Energy security Center of Excellence and Naval Postgraduate 
School have organized Table-Top Exercise «Coherent Resilience 2017» on Critical Electrical 
Infrastructure Security, which was held in Kyiv on 16-20 of October 2017
The table-top exercises had goals:
• To check existing procedures on prevention, 
protection, and response on incidents related 
to energy sector.
• To facilitate mutual cooperation departments 
in their actions to provide resilience of the 
National Power System, including 
international efforts to meet emerging 
security challenges.
• To identify the main aspects to be covered in 
developing contemporary Contingency plans 
for a Critical Energy Infrastructure – Unified 
Power System of Ukraine.
Participants were divided into four Syndicates, and were supposed to respond on vignettes and injections 
within existing Ukraine response and emergency plans and procedures with focus on: 
STRATCOM (dealing with hostile propaganda and manipulations as well as crisis communication);
SITE PROTECTION (dealing with cyber and terrorist attacks at CEI site level);
CRISIS RESPONSE (dealing with and energy crisis response on national level and interagency interaction);
INTERCOOP (dealing with interaction and response at an international level).
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Appeal to humanitarian international law 
Geneva Conventions of 1949  are not explicit about critical 
infrastructure protection
Most of Geneva Convention acts deal with combatants.  
The only Geneva Convention that does not deal with combatants is Convention (IV), 
which focuses on the protection of civilians but does not cover critical infrastructure 
objects.
Protocol I (8 June 1977) to the Geneva Conventions, relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts, includes an article that protects civilian objects from 
attack. 
Unfortunately, the definition of civilian objects is not clear.
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.33_GC-IV-EN.pdf
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0321.pdf
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Increasing International Cooperation in Cybersecurity 
and Adapting Cyber Norms
The United States and fifty-five other countries have signed the important Budapest 
Convention on Cybercrime (2001), but Russia and China have not.
Russia is the only nation participating in the Council of Europe not to have signed the Budapest 
Convention. The main reason for this is that paragraph 32 of the convention allows trans-border access 
to stored computer data during cybercrime investigations by the special services of various nations.
Russia prepared the draft convention, “On Cooperation in Countering Informational 
Crime”. The draft was presented to the UN in 2011, but the US and EU nations subjected 
the document to harsh criticism, mostly because of Moscow’s alleged intent to establish 
stricter control over its national segment of the internet. The new version was presented in 
2017.
The EU Directive “On security of network and information systems” (the NIS Directive) 
was adopted by the European Parliament on 6 July 2016 and entered into force in August 
2016.
We do not have a comprehensive, agreed by major actors,  
international legal framework in Cybersecurity
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Establishing an international framework on critical 
infrastructure protection
On the initiative of Ukraine, the UN Security Council adopted 
Resolution 2341 which calls on Member States to address threats 
against critical infrastructure and to establish an international 
framework for critical infrastructure protection and to set the 
measures the UN Secretariat and Member States have to perform.
Security Council Calls on Member States to Address Threats against Critical Infrastructure, 
Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2341 (2017) 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12714.doc.htm
http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2341
Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2341(2017)
- To ensure that they have established criminal responsibility for 
terrorist attacks intended to destroy or disable CI, as well as the 
planning of, training for, financing of, and logistical support for such 
attacks.
- To establish partnerships with stakeholders (…), to share 
information and experience in order to prevent, protect, mitigate, 
investigate, respond to and recover from damage from terrorist attacks on 
CI, including relevant communication or emergency warning 
networks.
- To assist in the delivery of effective and targeted capacity 
development, training and other necessary resources (…) to enable all 
States to achieve the goal of protection of CI against terrorist attacks.
- To continue working together to facilitate technical assistance and
capacity building, and to raise awareness in the field of protection of 
critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks, in particular by 
strengthening its dialogue with States.
UN Security Council Resolution 2341 (2017) to Address Threats against 
Critical Infrastructure calls upon all Member States:
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The problem: 
- The “infrastructural war” as a tool to influence population (not 
army forces) of countries under attack is a reality of modern 
warfare. 
- The World does not have an international legal framework that 
could restrict targeted actions against critical infrastructure. 
The hope: 
The more technologically, institutionally, and economically 
developed country the more vulnerable it is.
Developed countries have higher motivation to pay attention to the problem
Challenges to critical infrastructure protection
in modern hybrid warfare
The legal, political, ethical and moral restrictions 
on actions are in question!
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Thank You
and have success in  
your efforts!
Dr. Oleksandr Sukhodolia
Head of Energy Security 
and Technogenic Safety Department, 
The National Institute for Strategic Studies
E-mail: sam@niss.gov.ua
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